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Abstract: 
The best emissions tax or emissions cap may be an inferior instrument under incomplete 
regulation (leakage). Without leakage, an intensity standard (regulating emissions per unit of 
output) is inferior due to an implicit output subsidy. This inefficiency can be eliminated by an 
additional consumption tax. With leakage, an intensity standard can dominate the optimal 
emissions tax, since the implicit output subsidy prevents leakage. The addition of a consumption 
tax improves an intensity standard's efficiency, may prevent leakage, and may be efficient. 
Comparing intensity standards to output-based updating shows that the latter dominates if 
updating is sufficiently flexible. 
 intensity standards | externality | emissions trading | emissions taxes | leakage | Keywords:
incomplete regulation | market power 
Article: 
1. Introduction 
Emissions taxes and emissions markets are widely regarded as the preferred policy instruments 
for regulation of environmental externalities. Since these instruments can impose the correct 
price on a missing market, the instruments can mimic the first-best market mechanism and 
implement the efficient control of the externality. This paper investigates whether these 
instruments are indeed best in the presence of other market failures. Surprisingly, I show that 
these two instruments may be dominated by a third instrument, an intensity standard regulating 
emissions per unit of output, in the presence of incomplete regulation (leakage). In fact, since the 
analysis compares the second-best policies, the stronger result holds that under certain conditions 
any emissions tax (or cap) is dominated by an intensity standard. 
 
The inefficiency of intensity standards was established by Helfand [21] and Fischer [11].1 More 
recently Holland et al. [23] argued that California's Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS), an 
intensity standard regulating carbon emissions per unit of transportation fuel, cannot attain the 
first best, could increase carbon emissions, and has much higher abatement costs than an 
efficient policy. However, optimal intensity standards and optimal emissions taxes (or trading) 
have not been compared under leakage.2 
 
Incomplete regulation or leakage can occur for two reasons. First, a political jurisdiction may not 
be geographically consistent with the region that suffers environmental damages or with the 
product market. For example, since carbon is a global pollutant, regulating carbon emissions 
within any region (e.g. state, country, or set of countries) may cause production and emissions to 
“leak” to regions which do not regulate carbon. International leakage is especially troublesome 
since attempts to tax foreign-produced goods based on carbon content would likely violate 
international trade law. Winchester et al. [34] estimate leakage rates up to 10% from a national 
emissions cap but argue that border carbon adjustments can cut the leakage rate to about 3% if 
such adjustments do not violate international trade agreements. In addition to international 
leakage, the failure of the U.S. to achieve a national carbon policy has led states to adopt 
greenhouse gas initiatives [9]. For example, California passed legislation in 2006 capping 
greenhouse gas emissions, and a group of eastern states adopted the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI) in 2009. Policy makers recognized that leakage was a serious concern in both 
markets [29]. In particular, Fowlie [15] found the potential for dramatic leakage with the 
California cap. Note that the ability of regulators to limit interstate leakage is likely limited by 
the Interstate Commerce Clause. 
 
Second, within a political jurisdiction some sectors may use political clout to avoid regulation, or 
there may be costs to expanding the regulated base to cover 100% of the emissions. Metcalf [26] 
argues for a carbon tax base that covers 90% of U.S.'s carbon emissions, and Stavins [32] states 
that “nearly all” U.S. CO2 emissions could be captured by regulating 2000 upstream entities. 
Bluestein [4] estimates that “about 1250 entities [are] required for 95%+ capture of domestic 
[CO2] production.” However, proposed legislation is much less comprehensive. For example, 
biofuels are largely exempt from proposed carbon legislation since indirect land use effects are 
excluded from the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACES Act), H.R. 2454, 
also known as the Waxman–Markey bill. Once the scope of the regulation is set, production (and 
emissions) will tend to leak to the unregulated firms. 
 
While the main result of this paper, that an intensity standard can dominate the second-best 
emissions tax, is surprising in the light of the prior literature, the intuition is relatively 
straightforward. Environmental market mechanisms reduce emissions through both substitution 
and output effects. Substitution effects reduce emissions by employing additional capital (e.g. 
emissions control technology) or more costly fuel inputs (e.g. switching to a cleaner fuel source). 
Output effects reduce emissions by reducing consumption of the polluting good (e.g. through 
car-pooling or investments in energy efficiency). Intensity standards fail because although they 
induce an implicit emissions tax, they also induce an implicit output subsidy. This implicit output 
subsidy leads to inefficient consumption. For example, Holland et al. argue that the LCFS does 
not efficiently encourage carpooling, reduced driving, or vehicular fuel efficiency. Alternatively, 
a tax or emissions cap efficiently reduces emissions through both substitution and output effects. 
 
With leakage, an intensity standard can dominate because output effects from an emissions tax 
may be offset by leakage. If the supply of the unregulated sector is elastic enough and dirty 
enough, leakage from an emissions tax may even increase total emissions. An intensity standard 
can dominate since the implicit output subsidy can prevent leakage which might have occurred 
under an emissions tax. 
 
The implicit output subsidy from an intensity standard can lead to too much consumption. I show 
that this inefficiency can be remedied with a consumption tax on the externality producing good. 
In fact, an intensity standard and consumption tax combination can be efficient in the absence of 
leakage. Even with leakage, a consumption tax can increase the efficiency of an intensity 
standard. In fact under certain conditions, an intensity standard combined with a consumption tax 
can prevent leakage and attain efficiency whereas an emissions tax combined with a 
consumption tax cannot.3 Moreover, a consumption tax can apply equally to domestic and 
foreign production and thus can comply with trade laws. 
 
The implicit output subsidy of an intensity standard is similar to the incentives from output-based 
updating (also called output-based allocations) of emissions permits [13], [14] and [8]. Recent 
cap-and-trade legislation addressing climate change includes output-based updating for sectors 
susceptible to leakage.4,5 Both intensity standards and output-based updating pursue two 
objectives (penalizing emissions and encouraging output) with one instrument. Clearly two 
instruments would be superior, and I show that an optimal combined emissions tax and 
production subsidy (for the covered sector) dominate the optimal intensity standard. Whether 
output-based updating can dominate the optimal intensity standard depends on the degree to 
which the updating can mimic the optimal combined emissions tax and output subsidy. 
 
Intensity standards also have advantages for regulating externalities produced by firms with 
market power. Market power's effect on environmental regulation was first discussed by 
Buchanan [7], and Barnett [2] showed that the optimal emissions tax for a monopoly should 
generally be less than the marginal damages.6 These theoretical concerns are important as many 
polluting industries are likely subject to market power.7 Since the inefficiency from market 
power arises due to insufficient output, an intensity standard's implicit output subsidy may 
reduce the inefficiency of environmental regulation of firms with market power. In a related 
working paper, Holland [22] shows that the second-best intensity standard can dominate the 
second-best emissions tax when the externality producing firms have market power. 
 
Section 2 discusses several policies which regulate emissions intensities. The policies are all 
quite different. However, a common feature of the policies is that they do not regulate the level 
of the externality but regulate the intensity of the externality, which is the definition of an 
intensity standard. 
 
Section 3 presents the basic model with the externality as the sole market failure and illustrates 
the implicit emissions tax and output subsidy from an intensity standard. In the absence of 
leakage, the implicit output subsidy causes the intensity standard to be inefficient. Showing that 
this inefficiency is corrected by a consumption tax (even with heterogeneous firms) illustrates 
that this inefficiency arises from the implicit output subsidy rather than from mispricing of the 
externality. 
 
Section 4 extends the model to analyze leakage from a covered (domestic) sector to an 
uncovered (foreign) sector. I characterize the second-best emissions tax and intensity standard 
and show that neither policy can attain efficiency unless uncovered emissions are also taxed at 
marginal damages. The main result of the paper (the second proposition) shows that an intensity 
standard can dominate the second-best emissions tax and derives a sufficient condition for this 
dominance. I then address combining the policies with a consumption tax applied to both 
covered and uncovered production. This additional instrument is useful since it can allow the 
intensity standard to attain the first-best even though an emissions tax/consumption tax 
combination cannot. Extending the model to output-based updating shows the similarity of the 
two policies and the superiority of output-based updating if the output subsidy is sufficiently 
flexible. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Intensity standards in environmental regulation 
As used in this paper, an intensity standard refers to a policy which regulates an externality per 
unit of output. In contrast, a Pigouvian tax or a cap-and-trade program would simply regulate the 
level of the externality. There are several policies which have been adopted or proposed which 
regulate an externality per unit of output either at the firm level or at the market level through 
trading. This section describes five such policies: the Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS), the 
Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), several aspects of the 
Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAAs), and indexed regulation. These policies all differ in their 
definition of emissions and output and in whether or not trading is allowed. Note that trading 
transforms an intensity standard from a firm- to a market-level policy (Holland et al.). 
 
The Low Carbon Fuel Standard was launched in California by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger 
on January 18, 2007 ([1] and [6], and Holland et al.). The LCFS was intended to reduce 
California's carbon emissions by regulating the carbon intensity of motor fuel. Probably due to 
political expediency, California's LCFS was quickly adopted into law despite a lack of careful 
evaluation and despite economists' recommendations for a carbon fee or cap-and-trade program. 
 
Defining emissions was particularly difficult for the LCFS since tailpipe carbon emissions from 
gasoline and from advanced biofuels are equal although their lifecycle emissions may be 
dramatically different. California chose to define emissions based on lifecycle analysis, which 
has proved highly controversial [10] and [30]. 
 
Defining output also entailed several options each with different advantages and disadvantages. 
The simplest measure, gallons of fuel, would not account for the differences in energy content of 
fuels. For example, a gallon of ethanol (E85) has 65% of the energy content of a gallon of 
gasoline, but diesel fuel has slightly more energy per gallon. Miles traveled is a better measure of 
output, but mileage depends on many factors not controlled by the regulated entities. Ultimately 
California measured output as energy equivalent gallons of fuel with slight adjustments for 
differential drivetrain efficiencies. 
 
California's LCFS regulated the fuel blenders (e.g. Chevron). However, the aim of the policy was 
to reduce California's carbon intensity from motor fuel which did not necessarily require every 
blender to reduce its carbon intensity. Thus the LCFS instituted trading of “LCFS credits” which 
allows a blender to meet its obligation by purchasing credits from another blender who had 
produced enough low-carbon fuel to exceed the standard. Holland et al. show that trading 
transforms the LCFS into a market-level policy instead of a firm-level policy. 
 
A LCFS was included in several national bills to address climate change including in early 
versions of H.R. 2454 (known as Waxman–Markey) although a LCFS was not included in the 
version which passed the House. LCFSs have also been proposed in other regions and countries 
including: British Columbia, Washington, Oregon, Arizona, New Mexico, Minnesota, Illinois, 
the United Kingdom and the European Union (Holland et al.). 
 
Another intensity standard, a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) requires electricity providers 
to obtain a minimum percentage of their power from renewables. In the language of this paper, 
an RPS is an intensity standard regulating the nonrenewable intensity of electricity. There is no 
national RPS, but currently 24 states plus the District of Columbia have RPSs requiring from 
15% to 40% renewable power by various dates.8 There is substantial variation in the policies 
across states. Most variation arises in the definition of renewable, perhaps due to the ambiguity 
of the externality associated with nonrenewable electricity. For example, some states classify 
“waste tires” and “energy efficiency” as renewable, but no states classify nuclear as renewable 
despite its negligible emissions. The state-level RPSs are similar in that most allow trading and 
define output as MWs (capacity) or MWh (production) of electricity. 
 
The Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) regulates the share of “renewable” fuel in motor fuel. A 
national RFS was adopted as part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and was expanded under the 
Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007. The RFS adopted in EISA actually 
specifies the minimum levels of renewables rather than the minimum percentages.9 However, in 
implementing the law, the US EPA requires each blender to procure a specified percentage of 
renewable fuel (with trading allowed). Thus the RFS is quite similar to an intensity standard as 
used in this paper. 
 
Some regulations under the CAAAs specify performance standards (technology standards) for 
new equipment. For example, the regulations may require a NOx emissions rate measured in 
lbs/MW below some threshold, which may vary by region. Performance standards regulate the 
emissions intensity of equipment and hence are like smokestack-level intensity standards. The 
incentive effects of such performance standards have been criticized (e.g. see Helfand). 
However, the adverse effects are mitigated by the lack of trading since the implicit output 
subsidy is reduced. 
 
Newell and Pizer [27] and Pizer [28] analyze indexed regulations where the emissions cap is 
indexed, e.g. a carbon cap indexed to GDP. While conceptually similar to the intensity standard 
in this paper, an indexed carbon cap would not have an implicit output subsidy if the regulated 
firm views GDP as exogenous. However, if freely allocated permits were linked to each firm's 
output, the incentives under indexed regulation would be quite similar to an intensity standard. 
 
3. Regulation with no leakage 
To introduce the model and solution methods, I first analyze intensity standards combined with a 
consumption tax where the sole market failure arises from the externality. The consumption tax 
helps to illustrate the output subsidy implicit with the intensity standard and also illustrates that 
the inefficiency of the intensity standard arises primarily from this output subsidy rather than 
from mispricing the externality. 
Assume a (representative) firm produces output, q, with a concave production 
function f(k,e) with non-negative marginal products (fk≥0 and fe≥0) where k is a vector of market 
inputs (e.g. labor, capital, fuel, etc.) and e is an unpriced input (e.g. emissions).10 Let w be the 
price vector for the market inputs, and let theith market input, market input price, and marginal 
product be represented by ki, wi, and fki. Let U be the benefit from consumption, 
where U′>0 and U″<0, and let damages from emissions e be τe.11 
Suppose the firm is subject to two policies: an intensity standard σ such that e/q must be no 
greater than σand a consumption tax tc per unit of output. I first characterize the perfectly 
competitive equilibrium using the cost function. I then derive the optimal policy for the regulator 
who recognizes that its policy choices affect the resulting equilibrium. 
The firm's cost function depends on the intensity standard and is given 
byc(q;w,σ)=mink,ewk+λ[q−f(k,e)]+γ[e−σq] where λ and γ are Lagrange multipliers. Cost 
minimization implies that w=λfk(k,e), i.e.λ=wi/fki for every i, and γ=λfe(k,e) which implies 
thatγ=wife(k,e)/fki(k,e) for every i. Note that the envelope theorem implies 
that ∂c/∂σ=−γq=−qwife(k,e)/fki(k,e), so that increasing σ (relaxing the regulation) decreases costs. 
The envelope theorem further implies that the marginal cost is cq(q;w,σ)=λ−γσ=wi/fki·(1−feσ). 
This condition describes the output subsidy effect. With no unpriced inputs, the cost of 
increasing output by one (marginal) unit is the cost of the additional input required, 1/fki, times it 
price, wi. Cost minimization requires that the firm equates this cost across all market inputs. 
With an unpriced input and an intensity standard, the cost of increasing output by one (marginal) 
unit is reduced. Increasing output by one unit relaxes the standard which allows σ additional 
units of the unpriced input (emissions) and feσ additional units of free output. Thus increasing 
output requires additional market inputs for only the proportion 1−feσ of additional output. 
An intensity standard does not distort the relative prices faced by market inputs. The 
condition w=λfk(k,e)implies that the marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS) equals the 
market input price ratio,i.e.fki/fkj=wi/wj, for all market inputs i and j. Thus the intensity standard 
does not distort the relative prices faced by market inputs, but potentially distorts the price faced 
by emissions relative to market inputs if γ≠τ. 
The five endogenous variables in the equilibrium – q, λ, k, e, and γ – are completely determined 
by the two first-order conditions from cost minimization; the production function; the market 
clearing condition, U′(q)−tc=λ−γσ; and the binding intensity standard, e=σq. This completely 
characterizes the perfectly competitive equilibrium. 
Conditional on this equilibrium, the regulator can choose the consumption tax and intensity 
standard to maximize net social benefits 
 
where by assumption, the regulator receives no benefit from the tax revenue. The first order 
condition for tc is 
 
and for σ is 
 
As usual, each of these conditions can be interpreted as equating marginal cost and marginal 
benefit of strengthening the regulation. In Eq. (2) increasing the consumption tax results in costs 
from lost consumption (the left-hand side) but a benefit from reduced emissions. Similarly, in 
Eq. (3), tightening the intensity standard (reducing σ) has costs from lost consumption and higher 
production costs but a benefit from reduced emissions.12 
The appendix shows that the first-order condition for σ in Eq. (3) can be written 
 
This equation has two implications. First, if tc=τσ, then the optimal σ implies productive 
efficiency, i.e. the MRTS between each market input and pollution equals the social price ratio. 
If tc is chosen by the regulator, this suggests that the regulator can choose the consumption tax to 
attain productive efficiency. Second, if the consumption tax is not set optimally, e.g. if tc=0, then 
production is not efficient with the optimal σ unless the elasticity of output with respect to the 
intensity standard is zero. The actual result is somewhat stronger13: 
Proposition 1 
. (i) An intensity standard coupled with a consumption tax can attain the efficient level of 
emissions, input usage, and consumption. (ii) An intensity standard alone cannot attain efficiency 
if(tc−τσ)(∂q/∂tc)≠0(tc−τσ)(∂q/∂tc)≠0. 
Although a consumption tax cannot in general correct an externality if emissions rates are 
heterogeneous or endogenous, part (i) shows that a consumption tax combined with an intensity 
standard can be efficient. This follows since the optimal intensity standard can induce productive 
efficiency if tc=τσtc=τσ. Since the optimal consumption tax is tc=τσ, the optimal tax induces 
productive efficiency and exactly offsets the implicit output subsidy leading to efficiency. This 
result is analogous to, but more general than, a result in Holland et al. which showed that an 
LCFS combined with a gasoline tax could be efficient.14 
 
Since the optimal consumption tax depends on the intensity standard, it is not obvious that part i 
should hold with heterogeneous firms. An online appendix demonstrates that part (i) does indeed 
hold with heterogeneous firms, i.e. the optimal combined policy is efficient, if trading is 
allowed.15 Intuitively, trading puts a price on emissions. Since emissions of each firm face the 
same price, production is at least cost. By adjusting the stringency of the intensity standard, the 
regulator can set the price of emissions at marginal damages, so production is efficient. 
Adjusting the consumption tax then leads to efficiency, even with heterogeneous firms. 
 
The inefficiency of an intensity standard in part (ii) is analogous to results in Fischer [11], 
Holland et al. and in Helfand. The result illustrates in two ways that the inefficiency of the 
intensity standard arises from the implicit output subsidy. First, the inefficiency is corrected by 
the consumption tax as shown in part (i). Second, the condition shows that if ∂q/∂tc=0, the 
intensity standard can attain efficiency. Intuitively, if demand is perfectly inelastic, so that 
∂q/∂tc=0, an intensity standard can attain the first best since there is no output distortion and the 
standard leads to the efficient emissions. Similarly the inefficiency in Holland et al. requires 
elastic demand. 
 
4. Regulation with leakage 
To extend the model to analyze leakage, consider a covered (regulated or domestic) firm, which 
produces qC, and an uncovered (unregulated or foreign) firm, which produces qU. It is well-
known (and is demonstrated in the online appendix) that an emissions tax equal to marginal 
damages can be efficient in the absence of leakage. However, with leakage it is no longer clear 
that an emissions tax can be efficient or should equal marginal damages. This section first 
characterizes the perfectly competitive equilibrium with leakage for an emissions tax and for an 
intensity standard. The optimal regulations conditional on the equilibria are then compared. 
 
For simplicity, assume both the covered and uncovered firm have access to the same production 
technology described by the concave production function f(kj,ej) for j∈{C,U} where kj is a 
vector of market inputs (e.g. labor, capital, fuel, etc.) with prices w, and ej is an unpriced input 
(e.g. emissions). Let U(Q) be the benefit from consumption of the two perfect substitutes, 
i.e.Q=qC+qU, where, as before, U′>0 and U″<0.16 Let damages from pollution be τ(eC+eU).17 
Assume throughout that emissions of the uncovered firm are subject to an uncovered emissions 
charge, tU, (possibly zero), so its cost function is given by 
cU(qU;w,tU)=mink,ewkU+tUeU+λU[qU−f(kU,eU)] where λU is the Lagrange multiplier.18 Cost 
minimization implies the two first order conditions: w=λUfk(kU,eU) and tU=λUfe(kU,eU). The 
envelope theorem implies that the marginal cost is . 
4.1. Second-best emissions tax 
If the covered firm is subject to an emissions tax, t, its cost function is cC(qC;w,t); cost 
minimization implies that w=λCfk(kC,eC) and t=λCfe(kC,eC) where λC is the Lagrange 
multiplier; and the envelope theorem implies that . The eight endogenous variables 
in the equilibrium – qj, λj, kj, and ej– are completely determined by the four first-order 
conditions from cost minimization; the two production functions; and the two market clearing 
conditions: U′(Q)=λC=λU. 
Conditional on this perfectly competitive equilibrium, the regulator can choose the emissions tax 
on the covered sector to maximize net social benefits19 
 
Note that the emissions tax revenue is counted as a cost for the firms and thus must be added to 
the objective.20 The FOC is then 
 
Since the first two terms are zero by the market clearing conditions and the third and fourth 
terms are additive inverses by applying the envelope theorem to the covered firm's cost function, 
the FOC implies that 
Equation (5) 
 
To interpret this optimal emissions tax, consider two extremes.21 If the uncovered emissions 
charge is equal to marginal damages, i.e. if tU=τ, then the optimal emissions tax is equal to 
marginal damages and the first-best is attained. At the other extreme, if tU=0, the best tax is less 
than social damages if the tax decreases covered emissions and increases uncovered 
emissions, i.e. causes leakage. In this case, the MRTS of the covered firm is less than the input 
price ratio τ/wi, and covered emissions are too high relative to control technology, i.e. efficiency 
is not attained. 
4.2. Second-best intensity standard 
If the covered firm is subject to an intensity standard σ, the firm's cost function is cC(qC;w,σ); 
cost minimization implies w=λCfk(kC,eC) and γ=λCfe(kC,eC) where λC and γ are Lagrange 
multipliers; and the envelope theorem implies that . The nine endogenous 
variables in the equilibrium – qj, λj, kj, ej, and γ – are completely determined by the four first-
order conditions from cost minimization; the two production functions; the two market clearing 
conditions: U′(Q)=λC−γσ=λU; and the binding intensity standard: eC=σqC. 
Conditional on this equilibrium, the regulator chooses the intensity standard to maximize net 
social benefits 
 
 
The first order condition is then 
 
 
Since the first two terms are zero by the market clearing conditions and 
since −∂cC/∂σ=γqC=wiqCfe(kC,eC)/fki(kC,eC), this FOC implies that 
equation(6) 
 
 
Note that the optimal intensity standard does not equate the MRTS with the social input price 
ratio τ/wiand the deviation is greater (i) for a larger magnitude elasticity of output with respect to 
the standard; (ii) for a greater responsiveness of uncovered emissions with respect to the 
standard; and (iii) for greater deviation of the uncovered emissions charge from marginal 
damages. Also, note that even if the uncovered emissions charge is equal to marginal damages, 
the optimal standard does not attain the first best. In summary, efficiency is not attained. 
4.3. Comparing optimal emissions taxes and intensity standards 
Since 4.1 and 4.2 show that with leakage neither an emissions tax nor an intensity standard will 
generally attain the first best, either may dominate. Although the second-best net social benefits 
are difficult to compare analytically, the main result simply compares the possibilities and is easy 
to state and prove.22 
Proposition 2 
. (i) If the uncovered emissions charge equals marginal damages, i.e. iftU=τ, then the optimal 
emissions tax attains the first best, but the optimal intensity standard does not. (ii) IftU<τ, an 
intensity standard can dominate the second-best emissions tax. 
The result in Proposition 2 (i) follows from Proposition 1 and the well-known efficiency of 
Pigouvian taxes. IftU=τ, the optimal emissions tax simply mimics the uncovered emissions 
charge and emissions are correctly priced. The earlier analysis in Section 3 showed that the 
intensity standard does not generally attain the first best.23 
The result in Proposition 2 (ii) is a possibility result. If tU<τ, the analysis in Section 4.1 showed 
that the optimal emissions tax is less than τ and thus does not attain the first best. Although the 
intensity standard does not attain the first best either, the proof and numerical simulations 
in Table 1 show a number of examples where an intensity standard dominates the best emissions 
tax. 
Table 1. Single policies under incomplete regulation: comparing optimal emissions taxes with 
intensity standards under Cobb–Douglas and constant returns to scale. 
β Emissions tax (t=tU) Intensity standard DWL Output Emissions Standard dominates? 
Panel A. Lax uncovered emissions charge. tU=0.01 
 0.8 0.01 – 1.54 1.96 5.67 Yes 
– 1.93 0.66 1.96 3.79 
        0.5 0.01 – 5.21 1.86 13.14 Yes 
β Emissions tax (t=tU) Intensity standard DWL Output Emissions Standard dominates? 
– 3.54 2.06 1.86 6.57 
        0.2 0.01 – 5.37 1.62 12.24 Yes 
– 3.09 1.88 1.62 5.01 
       Panel B. Stringent uncovered emissions charge. tU=0.25 
 0.8 0.25 – 0.10 1.53 2.31 No 
– 1.01 0.30 1.53 1.55  
– 1.21 0.20 1.77 2.15  
         0.5 0.25 – 0.12 1.29 1.83 Yes 
 – 0.71 0.12 1.29 0.91  
– 0.84 0.10 1.40 1.18  
         0.2 0.25 – 0.05 1.28 0.74 Yes 
 – 0.24 0.02 1.28 0.30  
– 0.30 0.01 1.32 0.40  
Notes: Parameterization: U′(q)=2−q; f(k,e)=k1−βeβ; τ=0.5; and w=0.5. Efficient social surplus 
(quantity, emissions) is 0.69 (1.18, 1.55); 0.5 (1, 1); and 0.69 (1.18, 0.39). 
With a Cobb–Douglas production function and constant returns to 
scale, i.e. with  and∑iαi=1−β, a sufficient condition can be derived under which 
the intensity standard dominates. 
Corollary 1 
. With a Cobb–Douglas production function and constant returns to scale, the optimal intensity 
standard dominates the second-best emissions tax if the uncovered emissions charge is low, i.e. 
iftU/τ≤1−(1−β)(1−β)/β. 
Corollary 1 derives a sufficient condition for an intensity standard to dominate the best emissions 
tax. Intuitively, the intensity standard dominates if the uncovered emissions charge is sufficiently 
below marginal damages.24 The online appendix on international leakage derives an analogous 
condition showing that an intensity standard dominates if the second-best emissions tax is 
sufficiently below marginal damages, i.e. if the import price is sufficiently below the price that 
would result from a domestic emissions tax τ. 
The intuition of Proposition 2 can be illustrated with the special case involving constant returns 
to scale production functions. It is well known that with constant returns to scale, the marginal 
cost function is constant. In this case, leakage is extreme: any attempt to tax emissions leads to 
an increase in the marginal cost of covered firms and production shifts entirely to uncovered 
firms. Thus the second-best emissions tax is equal to tU, i.e. simply matches the uncovered 
emissions charge, and has no effect. 
Can an intensity standard do better? The online appendix shows that the marginal cost function 
with an intensity standard is also constant for constant returns to scale. Moreover, the marginal 
cost function is decreasing in σ.25 Thus, the regulator can adjust the intensity standard such that 
the marginal cost of the covered firm does not exceed the marginal cost of the uncovered firm, 
thereby preventing leakage and mimicking the marginal cost (and output level) of an emissions 
tax. This intensity standard will result in different inputs for producing the same level of output 
and may have lower social costs. The sufficient condition, tU/τ≤1−(1−β)(1−β)/β, insures that this 
intensity standard has lower social costs and hence dominates the optimal emissions tax. 
The right-hand side of the sufficient condition, 1−(1−β)(1−β)/β, is decreasing in β. Thus it is more 
likely that the intensity standard dominates an emissions tax if β is smaller. For example, 
if β=0.1, the intensity standard dominates if tU<0.6τ. However, if β=0.9, the intensity standard 
only dominates if the uncovered emissions charge is much more lax, i.e. if tU<0.2τ. Since Cobb–
Douglas assumes that all inputs are substitutes, simply estimating β from the expenditure share 
of emissions would be misleading. A more accurate estimate of β might come from the 
expenditure share of all inputs which are complements to emissions. 
Table 1 illustrates Proposition 2 for a simple numerical example. Panel A illustrates the case 
where the uncovered emissions charge is lax. The assumption of constant returns to scale implies 
that the best emissions tax matches the uncovered emissions charge. This tax is ineffective, and it 
is dominated by an intensity standard which leads to the same level of output but at lower social 
costs. Panel B illustrates a more stringent uncovered emissions charge and shows that the 
optimal emissions tax is not necessarily dominated. For β=0.8, the sufficient condition fails and 
the optimal intensity standard (σ=1.21) is dominated. For β=0.5, the sufficient condition holds 
with equality, so the intensity standard that mimics the best emissions tax does not reduce 
deadweight loss. However, the optimal intensity standard, which is slightly more lax, does 
dominate the optimal emissions tax. For β=0.2, the optimal emissions tax is dominated. 
Likewise, Online Appendix Table 1 shows that an intensity standard can dominate with 
decreasing returns to scale, and Online Appendix Table 2 illustrates a constant elasticity of 
substitution production function. 
4.4. Comparing the policies combined with consumption taxes 
The intensity standard and consumption tax combination seems quite promising especially given 
the result in Proposition 1. The following proposition shows that with leakage the intensity 
standard can still dominate an emissions tax even if both instruments are combined with a 
consumption tax. 
Proposition 3 
. IftU<τ, a combined intensity standard and consumption tax can dominate the second-best 
combination of an emissions tax and a consumption tax. 
This proposition is not surprising given the result in Proposition 2. However, the following 
corollary shows that an even stronger result can obtain, namely 
Corollary 2 
. With Cobb–Douglas technology and constant returns to scale, a combined intensity standard 
and consumption tax attain the first best ifftU/τ≥(1−β)1/β. 
With complete regulation, the intensity standard corrects the relative price of inputs, the 
consumption tax corrects the relative price of output, and the combined policy attains the first 
best. However, with incomplete regulation the stringency of the intensity standard may be 
constrained by the marginal cost of the uncovered firm. If the uncovered emissions charge is lax, 
the regulator would like to make the intensity standard more stringent but cannot since this 
would raise the marginal cost of the covered firm above the marginal cost of the uncovered firm 
(causing leakage). In this case, the intensity standard would be too lax and the consumption tax, 
given by tc=τσ would be too high to attain the first best. 
If the uncovered emissions charge is not lax, e.g. if tU/τ≥(1−β)1/β, the constraint does not bind, 
so the regulator can set the intensity standard and consumption tax at their optimal levels and can 
attain the first best.26 Note that attainment of the first best requires constant returns to scale. With 
increasing marginal costs, some uncovered production should occur, but since the uncovered 
production is undertaxed, the first best is not attained. 
Table 2 illustrates Proposition 3. Notice that the addition of the consumption tax reduces 
deadweight loss for all policies relative to Table 1 primarily by reducing output. In fact, for the 
emissions tax in Panel A, the optimal consumption tax simply stops production 
for β=0.5 and β=0.2. Note that the dominance of the intensity standard is maintained in Panel A 
with a lax uncovered emissions charge although efficiency is not attained. In Panel B the 
advantage of the emissions tax from Table 1 disappears, and the intensity standard/consumption 
tax combination attains the first best, even though the emissions tax/consumption tax 
combination does not. Note that the necessary and sufficient condition does not hold in Panel A 
but holds in Panel B. 
 
 
Table 2. Combined policies under incomplete regulation: comparing consumption taxes with 
emissions taxes or intensity standards under Cobb–Douglas and constant returns to scale. 
β Emissions tax 
(t=tU) 
Intensity 
standard 
Consumption 
tax 
DWL Output Emissions Standard 
dominates? 
Panel A. Lax uncovered emissions charge. tU=0.01 
 0.8 0.01 – 1.41 0.54 0.55 1.59 Yes 
– 1.93 0.96 0.19 1.00 1.93 
 0.5 0.01 – 1.86 0.500 0 0 Yes 
– 3.54 1.77 0.496 0.09 0.32  
 0.2 0.01 – 1.62 0.691 0 0 Yes 
 – 3.09 1.54 0.688 0.08 0.24 
          Panel B. Stringent uncovered emissions charge. tU=0.25 
  0.8 0.25 – 0.38 0.03 1.15 1.74 Yes/first best 
 – 1.32 0.66 0 1.18 1.55  
  0.5 0.25 – 0.35 0.06 0.94 1.33 Yes/first best 
 – 1.00 0.50 0 1.00 1.00  
  0.2 0.25 – 0.14 0.04 1.14 0.65 Yes/first best 
 – 0.33 0.16 0 1.18 0.39  
 Notes: Parameterization: U′(q)=2−q; f(k,e)=k1−βeβ; t=0.5; and w=0.5. Efficient social surplus 
(quantity, emissions) is 0.69 (1.18, 1.55); 0.5 (1, 1); and 0.69 (1.18, 0.39). 
4.5. Comparing intensity standards and output-based updating 
With incomplete regulation, the advantage of the intensity standard is that it implicitly subsidizes 
production while taxing emissions. Similarly, output-based updating of emissions permits 
implicitly subsidizes production while capping emissions. 
To illustrate the implicit subsidy with output-based updating, suppose the regulator gives the 
firm  free permits where η∈(0,1) is the fraction of freely allocated permits,  is the emissions 
cap, and R depends on the firm's output. For example, if updating is based on the share of total 
output then R=qC/Q. Although the regulator could use a variety of rules to update allocations, 
this definition of R is similar to that in Fischer[11], Fischer and Fox [13] and [14], and Bushnell 
and Chen. 
If pe is the price of emissions permits, the regulated firm's cost minimization 
is . Note that the firm must purchase 
permits to cover its emissions at cost peeC, but receives a free allocation of permits with 
value . The cost minimization conditions are that w=λCfk(kC,eC) and pe=λCfe(kC,eC). 
Applying the envelope theorem to the cost function implies that  and 
that . Since both of these derivatives are negative, increasing the generosity of 
output-based updating, η, or the emissions cap, , decreases costs. 
The envelope theorem also implies that the marginal cost of the regulated firm 
is . This equation illustrates the implicit output subsidy 
when ∂R/∂qC>0, i.e. if the firm recognizes that increasing its output increases its allocation. 
Assuming a representative firm implies that  and that the equilibrium permit price is 
determined by . The equilibrium is then completely described by the cost 
minimization conditions; the production functions; the two market clearing 
conditions, ; and market clearing in the permit 
market  and . 
The implicit output subsidy depends on the number of permits, , the generosity of the 
updating, η, and how the firm's output increases its allocation, dR/dqC. The first two of these are 
policy parameters which the regulator can use to influence the strength of the implicit subsidy. 
The final factor depends on policy choices,e.g. the precise rule used, as well as other factors such 
as the amount of leakage and the amount of market power. For example, if R=qC/Q, 
then dR/dqC=1/Q−qC/Q2. This implies that as qC→Q, e.g. a monopoly with minimal leakage, 
this derivative (and hence the output subsidy) goes to zero. However, if the firm is small relative 
to the market, its contribution to total output may be negligible so that . 
This assumption is used in Fischer and Fox and Bushnell and Chen. 
Since output-based updating has considerable flexibility in the strength of the implicit output 
subsidy, a useful approximation is to compare the optimal intensity standard with a combined 
emissions tax and output subsidy to the covered firm. Intuitively, the combination of two 
instruments is likely to dominate the single instrument. This intuition is correct. 
 
Proposition 4 
. The second-best combination of an emissions tax and an output subsidy for covered firms 
dominates the second-best intensity standard. 
This result suggests that output-based updating is superior to an intensity standard if the subsidy 
inherent in the output-based updating is sufficiently flexible to mimic the optimal output subsidy. 
This may or may not be the case. Assuming that , some calculations based on the 
parameterization in Table 1 Panel B show that the optimal emissions cap with output-based 
updating and η=1 dominates the optimal intensity standard for β=0.8 (DWL is reduced from 0.20 
to 0.08) but not for β=0.5 or β=0.2 (DWL increases from 0.10 to 0.12 and from 0.01 to 0.02). 
Thus the superiority of output-based updating depends on the details of its implementation. 
The result also suggests that simply subsidizing output (combined with an emissions tax) might 
be superior to output-based updating since it clearly dominates an intensity standard and does not 
suffer from some of the other problems of output-based updating such as permit price “inflation” 
and the unclear linkage between a firm's output and its subsidy. Of course, the analysis in 
Section 4.4 suggests that combining these policies with a consumption tax could increase 
efficiency further. 
 
4.6. Extending the model 
Global climate change from greenhouse gas emissions is arguably the most important externality 
currently requiring additional regulation. Since leakage is a potential concern with carbon 
regulation, intensity standards might be a useful tool for policy makers. However, greenhouse 
gas emissions are a stock pollutant so it is important to extend the current static framework to 
include the dynamic aspects of carbon regulation. 
 
Extending the current framework to model damages from a stock pollutant is relatively 
straightforward. Throughout the analysis, damages are simply assumed to be τe. With a stock 
pollutant, damages are a function of the stock of pollution. Since emitting a ton of pollution 
today affects the current stock of pollution as well as the stock of pollution in all subsequent 
years, the marginal damages from a ton of pollution today is the sum of the marginal damages of 
all future years weighted by a decay factor. For a persistent stock pollutant like carbon, this 
makes the marginal damages for any year quite flat, so they are reasonably approximated by 
constant marginal damages. 
 
Intertemporal cost minimization is more complicated. Kling and Rubin [24] first showed that 
intertemporal trading of emissions permits can be inefficient if it allows firms to inefficiently 
delay abatement. A similar inefficiency would likely arise if an intensity standard allowed 
intertemporal trading through banking and/or borrowing of credits. On the other hand, Yates and 
Cronshaw [35] showed that intertemporal trading can smooth abatement cost shocks. Whether or 
not credits for an intensity standard should be banked or borrowed likely depends on the details 
of the program and the externality. 
 
Finally, the framework in this paper does not model the uncertainty inherent in damages and 
abatement costs. Weitzman [33] first showed that an emissions tax might be preferred to an 
emissions cap if marginal damages are flat relative to marginal abatement costs and information 
about abatement costs is asymmetric. Since an intensity standard offers more flexibility than an 
emissions cap, it might dominate an emissions cap if marginal damages are relatively flat. 
However, a more complete analysis of asymmetric information is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper demonstrates that an emissions tax (or equivalently an emissions cap) may not be the 
best instrument for correcting an environmental externality in the presence of incomplete 
regulation (leakage). In fact, since I analyze the second-best policies, the results show that any 
emissions tax may be dominated by an intensity standard. A sufficient condition shows that the 
dominance is more likely if the second-best emissions tax is sufficiently below marginal 
damages. 
 
An intensity standard implicitly subsidizes output while implicitly taxing the externality. This 
output subsidy is the source of the inefficiency of an intensity standard, and the analysis shows 
that it can be corrected by a consumption tax. However, the output subsidy is an advantage for 
the policy maker when confronted with the potential for leakage. The implicit output subsidy 
prevents leakage and can lead an intensity standard to dominate an emissions tax. Combining an 
intensity standard with a consumption tax further increases the advantage of the intensity 
standard and may even attain the first best. 
 
With multiple market failures the policy choice is whether to use a potentially inferior instrument 
hoping other market failures can be addressed with other instruments or to use a superior 
instrument and accept the second-best world. This paper provides a framework for analyzing 
these policy instruments and suggests that an intensity standard should not be neglected. 
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Appendix A.  
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1 
To derive Eq. (4), note that Eq. (3) can be written 
 
where the first term follows from the market clearing condition U′(q)−cq=tc, the second term 
follows from applying the envelope theorem, and the last term follows since ∂e/∂σ=q+σ∂q/∂σ. 
Eq. (4) 
 
 
follows by algebra. 
Eq. (2) implies that 
equation(7) 
 
 
where the last equality follows since e=σq. Eq. (7) then implies that tc=τσ. Note that this 
condition combined with Eq. (4) shows that production is efficient when the intensity standard 
and consumption tax are optimally chosen. 
To show that consumption is efficient, note that tc=τσ, Eq. (4), and cost minimization imply 
thatτ=wife/fki=γ. Thus U′(q)=tc+λ−γσ=τσ+λ−τσ=λ. So U′(q)=wi/fki for 
every i and U′(q)=τ/fe,i.e. the allocation is efficient. 
To prove part (ii), note that if the regulator cannot set tc, the optimal intensity standard is 
determined by Eq.(4). If W is the regulator's objective function from Eq. (1), then 
equation(8) 
 
 
The RHS of Eq. (8) will be positive if tc is less than τσ, so increasing tc would increase social 
surplus,i.e. an intensity standard is not efficient. 
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2 
The result in (i) is proved in the text. The possibility result (ii) is proved by the example that 
follows in the proof of Corollary 1, as well as by the numerical examples that appear in the text 
and in the online appendices. 
A.3. Proof of Corollary 1 
With constant returns to scale, the marginal cost functions under both an emissions tax and 
intensity standard are constant as shown in Online Appendix Lemma 1. Since an emissions tax 
greater than tU would increase the covered firm's marginal cost and cause complete spillovers, 
the second-best emissions tax istU. 
A binding intensity standard can mimic the second-best emissions tax. To prove the sufficient 
condition, let the equilibrium with the second-best emissions tax be given by eC⁎, kC⁎, eU⁎=0, 
and kU⁎=0.27 Note that this equilibrium is characterized by U′(Q⁎)=M⁎ where M⁎ is defined in 
(13) for t=tU. ThuseC⁎=M⁎βQ⁎/tU and . Let eC′, kC′ define the binding intensity 
standard which mimics the second-best emissions tax. This equilibrium is characterized 
by  which implies that . 
Furthermore  since output must be equal. Now compare the 
social costs. Note 
that wkC′+τeC′≤wkC⁎+τeC⁎ iff M⁎Q⁎∑iαi/(1−β)+τM⁎βQ⁎/tU·(1−β)(1−β)/β≤M⁎Q⁎∑iαi+τM⁎βQ⁎/
tU iff tU/τ≤1−(1−β)(1−β)/β. If this sufficient condition holds, mimicking the second-best 
emissions tax with an intensity standard reduces (does not increase) social costs, so the second-
best emissions tax is dominated.28 
A.4. Proof of Proposition 3 
The possibility result is proved by the example that follows in the proof of Corollary 2 as well as 
by numerical examples in the text. 
A.5. Proof of Corollary 2 
Consider an intensity standard consumption tax combination which would attain the first best in 
the absence an uncovered firm. In particular, let σ=1/K·∏i(βwi/ταi)αi and let tc=τσ. Since the 
production function implies that σ=e/q=1/K·∏i(e/ki)αi, equilibrium will have βwi/ταi=e/ki for 
every i which impliesfe/fki=τ/wi, i.e. MRTSs are equal to the social price ratios.29 Now note that 
the marginal cost is 
equation(9) 
 
where the first equality follows from cost minimization, the second equality from substitution of 
the marginal products, the third since MRTSs are correct, and the fourth by substitution 
for σ.30 If this marginal cost is less than the marginal cost of the uncovered firm then there is no 
leakage, and this policy combination attains the first best. The uncovered marginal cost is given 
by M⁎ which is defined in (13) for t=tU. Comparing (13) and (9), shows 
that cq(q;w,σ)≤M⁎ iff  iff tU/τ≥(1−β)1/β. 
A.6. Proof of Proposition 4 
Consider the second-best intensity standard, σ⁎ under incomplete regulation. Denote the 
resulting equilibrium values by eC⁎, kC⁎, eU⁎, and kU⁎.31 Note that this equilibrium is 
completely characterized by eC⁎=σ⁎qC⁎ and the equations 
 
 
Now consider the emissions tax t and output subsidy s to the covered firm 
wheret=wife(kC⁎,eC⁎)/fki(kC⁎,eC⁎) and s=tσ⁎.32 Note that this equilibrium is characterized by 
the equations 
equation(10) 
 
 
It is straightforward to verify that eC⁎, kC⁎eU⁎, and kU⁎ are equilibrium values for 
this t and s, i.e. the equilibria are identical. First, the second equation of (10) implies 
thatwife(kC,eC)/fki(kC,eC)=t=wife(kC⁎,eC⁎)/fki(kC⁎,eC⁎), so the MRTSs of the covered firm 
are identical for all inputs. Second, the first equation of (10) shows that Q⁎ is the equilibrium 
output level. Since output and the uncovered and covered MRTSs are identical, the equilibria are 
identical. 
To complete the proof, note that the equilibrium with the second-best intensity standard is 
mimicked by the equilibrium with this t and s. Since the second-best emissions tax and output 
subsidy to the covered firm can do no worse, the second-best intensity standard is dominated. 
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Notes 
1 Fullerton and Heutel [17] analyze the incidence of intensity standards. 
Fischer [12] characterizes the imperfect competition equilibrium with intensity standards. 
2 The cost-effectiveness of a variety of policy instruments, including intensity standards, has 
been analyzed in the presence of pre-existing distortionary taxes [19] and in the presence of 
industry compensation requirements [5]. 
3 See also Fullerton [16] and Fullerton and Mohr [18] on similar combined instruments. 
4 Output-based updating is included in the House version of Waxman–Markey. 
5 Stavins [31] argues instead for requiring that imports of carbon-intensive products – such as 
iron and steel, aluminum, cement, bulk glass, and paper, and possibly a very limited set of other 
particularly CO2emissions-intensive goods – carry with them CO2 allowances. This scheme may 
conflict with trade law. 
6 Mansur [25] compares taxes and emissions trading in concentrated industries. 
7 For example, electricity is usually provided by regulated monopolies, world oil markets are 
affected by the OPEC cartel, and petroleum refining, coal mines, railroad transport of coal and 
ethanol, and cement and steel production are highly concentrated. 
8 See  http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/states/maps/renewable_portfolio_states.cfm and 
http://www.epa.gov/chp/state-policy/renewable.html. 
9 See pp. 14670-904 of Federal Register, vol. 75, No. 58, Friday, March 26, 2010, Rules and 
Regulations. 
10 Similarly, Baumol and Oates [3] and Fullerton and Heutel [17] model emissions as an input. 
11 Marginal damages are assumed constant, but the results are easily extended to increasing 
marginal damages by letting damages be an increasing function of e and replacing τ throughout 
by the derivative of this function. 
12 Since the regulator's objective may not be globally concave in tc and σ, the optimal policy 
may be a corner solution. Holland et al. show that the optimal LCFS is non-binding under certain 
conditions. 
13 All proofs are in the appendices. 
14 See also Fullerton and Mohr [18]. 
15 The Journal's repository of online supplemental material can be accessed 
at http://aere.org/journals. 
16 The model is readily extended to imperfect substitutes. If the goods are not substitutable 
(i.e. are additively separable), then there is no leakage, and the emissions tax dominates. As 
goods become closer substitutes, leakage increases, and the emissions tax may be dominated. 
17 Marginal damages, which capture whatever damages the regulator is concerned about, are 
assumed independent of the source as is the case with carbon emissions. The results are easily 
extended to different transfer coefficients. 
18 If tU=0 and fe>0, demand for emissions is infinite. If tU>0, emissions are finite. Note 
that tU could model an implicit or implied tax on emissions. 
19 This objective is quite general and can model leakage within and across political jurisdictions 
depending on who “the regulator” is and on what benefits/costs enter the objective. An online 
appendix explicitly models international leakage where the regulator is concerned solely with 
domestic benefits. As above, the revenue from the emissions tax or the uncovered emissions 
charge provides no benefit as explained in footnote 20. 
20 The regulator does not receive any benefit from the tax revenue. To see this, note that the 
objective is equivalent to U(Q)−wkC−wkU−τ(eC+eU). To model a benefit (cost) from tax 
revenue (for example, from off-setting other distortionary taxes) a multiplier could be included 
on the te term. 
21 Two other cases deserve note. If the goods are not substitutable (i.e. are additively separable), 
[5] is unchanged but ∂eU/∂t=0, i.e. there is no leakage, so the optimal emissions tax is τ. 
Alternatively, if the pollutant is local, τ−tU in [5] is zero or negative, so the optimal emission tax 
is τ or greater. 
22 The difficulty lies in deriving the optimal second-best policy, since it generally depends on 
how emissions change with the policy, i.e.∂e/∂t in [5] and ∂e/∂σ in [6]. On the other hand, it is 
quite easy to solve for the equilibrium for a given tax or intensity standard. Rather than using [5] 
or [6] directly, the numerical examples derive equilibrium net social benefits for a given policy 
and then choose the policy to optimize net social benefits. 
23 Under constant returns to scale where tU=τ, an intensity standard can attain the first best by 
settingσ=0, so all production leaks to uncovered firms where emissions are correctly priced. 
24 The condition is not necessary since it only demonstrates that the intensity standard which 
mimics the second-best emissions tax has lower social costs. Even if this intensity standard has 
higher social costs, the optimal intensity standard can have lower deadweight loss. 
25 Total costs are decreasing in σ, hence marginal cost (equal to average cost) is also decreasing. 
26 The right hand side of the necessary and sufficient condition is decreasing in β. Thus 
as β increases it is more likely that the intensity standard/consumption tax combination attains 
the first best. 
27 Note “⁎” and “′” are defined only for this proof. 
28 A sufficient condition can be similarly derived for decreasing returns to scale by a slight 
modification of the proof. The more general sufficient condition, which depends on the 
endogenous t⁎ ist⁎/τ≤1−(1−β)∑αi/β·(1−β)/∑αi. 
29 For this σ, an equilibrium exists with efficient MRTSs. If other equilibria exist, this may not 
hold. 
30 Note that U′(q)−tc=cq=τσ/β−τσ so U′(q)=τ/fe, i.e. output is correct as in Proposition 1. 
31 Note “⁎” and “′” are defined only for this proof. 
32 t is well-defined since wi/fki·(1−feσ)=wj/fkj·(1−feσ) implies wi/fki=wj/fkj. 
 
